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Ethical Problems Involved in Undercover Operations
Against Lawyers-The Congressional Testimony of
Monroe Freedman
I.

Written Testimony of Professor Monroe H. Freedman
Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Law
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary
Regarding S. 804-Undercover Operations Act
May 16, 1984

Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me to testify regarding S. 804-The Undercover Operations Act. I have been asked to provide relevant biographical
information and have done so in a footnote.I
My principal concern with S. 804 relates to undercover operations
directed against corruption in the administration of justice. I do not
mean that such investigations necessarily raise more serious problems
than those directed against, say, political organizations, religious groups,
or news agencies; indeed, some of my suggestions may be applicable
to those areas as well. As one who has a particular interest in the professional responsibilities of lawyers and judges, however, I believe that
I can be most useful to the Committee by focusing on that area.
A.
The Special Need For Undercover Operations against Lawyers
and Judges
There is surely no need to belabor the importance of integrity in
the administration of justice, or the necessity to pursue any corruption
vigorously. At the same time, we must recognize that undercover operations directed against lawyers and judges, if inadequately controlled,
could have an even more severe impact on the administration of justice
than whatever corruption exists.
1. Monroe H. Freedman is Professor of Law and former Dean of Hofstra
University Law School. He has testified on several occasions before the Judiciary Committees of the United States Senate and House of Representatives, and has qualified
as an expert witness on lawyers' ethics in federal and state proceedings, serving in
one case as an expert on behalf of the United States Department of Justice. He has
been chairman of three committees on legal ethics, and a member of the Governing
Board of the District of Columbia Bar. He was also Reporter and principal draftsman
of the American Lawyers' Code of Conduct, and his book, Lawyers' Ethics in an

Adversary System, won the American Bar Association's Gavel Award Certificate of
Merit. Professor Freedman also served as legislative consultant to Senator John L.
McClellan.
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I would like to be able to say that undercover operations are unnecessary because the bar is effectively policing lawyers and judges.
That is not so. For example, the Code of Professional Responsibility
is in force, substantially, in most jurisdictions in the United States.
Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A) of that Code requires a lawyer to report
unprivileged knowledge of dishonesty on the part of another lawyer.
Yet that essential self-policing requirement has never to my knowledge
been enforced. Also, in the District of Columbia, DR 1-103(A) was
denounced as an "informer" provision, and the requirement to reveal
dishonesty by another lawyer was deleted from the Code by a substantial majority vote of the bar.
In addition, the Code affords judges a special solicitude. Even
if a lawyer has knowledge of judicial corruption, under DR 1-103(B)
the lawyer is required to reveal that knowledge only upon "proper request" of an authorized investigatory agency. That is, in the absence
of a specific request, lawyers are permitted to withhold knowledge of
judicial corruption. 2
Of necessity, moreover, the disciplinary rules relate to the limited
situation in which a lawyer has received knowledge of dishonesty. There
is not, nor should there be, a rule requiring lawyers to investigate each
other, or judges, in order to seek out evidence of dishonest conduct.
If, therefore, we are to take seriously the problem of corruption
in the administration of justice-and we must-there are going to be
situations in which undercover operations are the only way to go about
it. If there is probable cause to believe that a judge is soliciting bribes,
that a lawyer is suborning (that is, corruptly inducing) perjury, or that
a lawyer is manufacturing false claims and filing fraudulent complaints,
then an undercover operation may be the only method to obtain the
necessary proof to support a prosecution. Also, such an operation,
to be successful, may require sham cases, 3 the filing of fraudulent claims,
and the presentation of false testimony."
2. The proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 8.3, would require a lawyer to inform the appropriate authority about dishonesty on the part of
judges as well as lawyers. However, Rule 8.2 would have a chilling effect on any lawyer
contemplating informing on a judge. Also, there is no reason to believe that the proposed rule would be enforced any more vigorously or effectively than the present one.
3. For an illustration of a sham case, and the delicate issues that may be raised,
see the careful opinion of Judge William G. Young of the Massachusetts Superior
Court in Commonwealth v. Shulman (attached as Appendix A).
4. It is nonsensical to suggest that a prosecutor who presents false testimony
as a necessary part of an undercover operation is knowingly using perjured testimony
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B. The Special Dangers of Undercover Operations against
Lawyers and Judges
The dangers to the administration of justice that are presented
by undercover operations against lawyers and judges would be difficult
to overstate. I frequently speak to bar groups throughout the country,
and discussion turns, almost invariably, to anxieties about sting operations directed against lawyers. Those discussions have convinced me
that the possibility that a lawyer in any case may be facing a sham
client in an undercover role has already had a chilling effect upon the
effective assistance of counsel to which clients are entitled under the
Sixth Amendment.
I have found lawyers who, in their interviews with clients, are fearful of being quoted (or tape-recorded) out of context; lawyers who
are fearful of seeking to gain a client's trust by words of sympathetic
understanding that might later be distorted and misconstrued; and
lawyers who are so intent upon covering their own flanks that their
professional obligation of zealous dedication to the client's cause has
been compromised. I have also seen significant evidence that some
criminal defense lawyers have become fearful of offending prosecutors
by vigorous representation of their clients.
When the right to counsel is thus impaired, other fundamental
rights suffer. In criminal cases, denial of effective assistance of counsel
results in the loss of due process of law and of equal protection of
the laws, impairs the right to trial by jury, and may cause the loss
of the privilege against self-incrimination, rights of autonomy, and protection against unlawful search and seizure. In a civil case, the client
may also be deprived of the First Amendment right to petition for
redress of grievances through the judicial system.
Thus, the devastating impact of undercover operations against
lawyers are already being felt in the administration of justice, and the
deleterious effects on some of our most precious rights are potentially
enormous.
Other serious problems in the administration of justice are exacerbated by inadequately controlled under-cover operations against lawyers
and judges. Justice Robert Jackson (a former Attorney General) referred to the discretion to investigate as "the most dangerous power of
the prosecutor," because it enables the prosecutor to "pick people he

or false evidence within the meaning of DR 7-102(A)(4). One might as well charge
a firefighter with arson for setting a backfire to contain a forest fire.
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thinks he should get rather than pick cases that need to be prosecuted."
Thus, law enforcement "becomes personal," with the risk that "the
real crime becomes that of being . . . personally obnoxious to or in
the way of the prosecutor himself." ' Since those words were spoken,
we have seen a "Get Hoffa Squad" in the Department of Justice and
an Enemies List drawn up in the White House.
It is realistic, therefore, to be deeply concerned about abuses of
prosecutorial discretion to target those who are "in the way of the
prosecutor himself"-a group that could well include judges who are
conscientious in respecting the constitutional rights of criminal defendants, and defense lawyers who are zealous in representing their clients.
Serious conflict-of-interest problems are raised, therefore, whenever
a prosecutor's office initiates an undercover operation against a judge
before whom members of that office have lost motions or cases, or
against a lawyer who has defended clients prosecuted by that office.
Other common problems of prosecutors' professional responsibilities are heightened in such cases. As this Committee has seen,
unlawful leaks to the press of secret grand jury information, and other
prejudicial pretrial publicity, can be most severe in cases of undercover
operations. 6 In Operation Greylord, for example, there were a number
of grand jury leaks to the press, and United States Attorney Dan K.
Webb held a dramatic pretrial press conference in which he condemned the defendants-to-be without due process, and unethically vouched
for the probity of the witnesses he would be producing at trial.
Also, incomplete tape recordings of conversations between lawyers
and clients can be particularly misleading when taken out of the full
context of complex lawyer-client dialogues that may have extended over
many weeks, or even years. For example, a lawyer who is properly
reminding a forgetful or inarticulate client of facts related by the client
in an earlier interview, may well appear, on a partial tape recording,
to be prompting the client to testify falsely. Lawyers who are concerned about undercover investigations will therefore be inhibited in
fulfilling their professional responsibilities.
"Trading up"-where a prosecutor bribes a defendant or a convict with leniency in exchange for evidence against someone whom the

5. Address by Justice Jackson, Second Annual Conference of U.S. Attorneys,
April, 1940.
6. It is no doubt futile to hope that a United States Attorney will conduct
a sting operation in his or her own office, to identify the sources of grand jury leaks
and other improper pretrial publicity.
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prosecutor wants to get-is a particularly vicious practice when it involves turning a client against his lawyer. The inducements to false
testimony are often overwhelming, the reliability of the testimony under
such circumstances is highly suspect, 7 and the adverse impact on the
lawyer-client relationship in general, as a result of even one such case,
could be considerable.
C.

Proposed Revisions of S. 804

Remarks at the outset of this testimony should have made it clear
that I consider some undercover operations against lawyers and judges
to be necessary to maintain integrity in the administration of justice.
I therefore agree with the goals of the sponsors of S. 804. In addition,
I admire the conscientious effort they have made to cope with the
awesome problems involved in such a complex and delicate matter.
I believe, however, that certain additional safeguards should be included
in the Undercover Operations Act, at least with respect to investigations directed against lawyers and judges.
The standard expressed in §§ 3803(a)(3) and (4) of S. 804 is a
sound and essential one: there must be a finding of "probable cause
to believe that the operation is necessary to detect or prevent specific
acts of criminality" before certain undercover activities may be undertaken. (Emphasis added) The activities properly subject to that standard include infiltration of a court and situations in which a government agent, informant, or cooperating individual "will pose as an attorney . . . and there is a significant risk that another individual will
enter into a confidential relationship with that person ...
.
In addition, §§3803(b)(6) through (9) prevent the head of a field
office from conducting undercover operations on mere "reasonable
suspicion" in similar circumstances posing threats to the proper administration of justice. In particular, § 3803(b)(7) relates to a situation
in which an undercover employee or cooperating individual "will attend a meeting between a subject of the investigation and his lawyer."
Those are necessary and wise provisions. Yet serious problems remain, of both procedure and substance.
For example, the only oversight with respect to exercise of pro7. Witnesses who are found to have given false evidence in support of a prosecution are virtually never prosecuted for perjury, obstruction of justice, contempt
of court, etc. (unless, of course, the prosecution perjury comes to light because the
witness has recanted). That circumstance is another instance of a prosecutor's conflict

of interest.
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secutorial discretion and observance of the standards under S. 804 is
by the Undercover Operations Review Committee, established in §
3801(b)(6). That Committee must consist of at least six voting members,
at least one of whom is an Assistant Director of the FBI and one a
representative of the Office of Legal Council of the Department of
Justice. The bill does not require, however, that the vote authorizing
an undercover operation be unanimous-as it should be, at least in
operations directed against lawyers and judges. In fact, there is not
even an expressed requirement of a majority vote, nor a requirement
that the two officials specifically designated in the statute must vote
in support of an investigation in order to authorize it.
In addition, under § 3803(e) there is no possibility of judicial review
of any failure to comply with the standards or of any abuse of discretion; and under § 3803(a) civil action is expressly denied for any injury
caused by "operational or management decisions relating to the conduct of the undercover operation."
In short, therefore, prosecutorial discretion to target an
individual-what Justice Jackson called "the most dangerous" power
of all-is unfettered by any judicial oversight or sanction whatsoever.
That is so even if the individual who is targeted is a judge who has
earned the enmity of a prosecutor's office by conscientious concern
for defendants' rights, or a lawyer who has been properly zealous in
representing clients. Moreover, the lack of any after-the-fact sanction
for targeting by an Enemies List is compounded by the absence of
any requirement of a judicial warrant at the outset. Thus, the only
control of prosecutorial (executive department) abuse of discretion is
voluntary compliance by the prosecutors (executive department)
themselves. Yet an area as sensitive as undercover operations is one
that especially demands application of the fundamental American constitutional concept of checks and balances by one branch of government against another.
At the very least, therefore, provisions should be added that require a judicial warrant to initiate an undercover operation against
judges or lawyers, and any prosecution resulting from a failure to abide
by the standards or by an abuse of discretion should be subject to
dismissal on that ground.
Also, the provision in § 3804 for a tort claim against the Untied
States relates to any person who suffers "injury to his person, or property, or death." That provision should expressly include injury to professional reputation; also, because the defamatory effects would be
so hard to prove in dollars and cents (even though unquestionably pre-
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sent), punitive damages should be expressly allowed, even if limited
by a statutory maximum amount.
In addition, § 3804(a) covers injury resulting from non-criminal
"negligence... in the supervision or exercise of control over an undercover operation" (emphasis added); but that section does not cover
non-criminal conduct that wilfully causes injury to person, property,
or reputation. Harm wilfully caused in the supervision, control, or conduct of an undercover operation should be explicitly included under
§ 3804(a).
Another important sanction against abuse is immunity from prosecution for any crime that is discussed in an apparently privileged
context by an accused with an undercover operative posing as that person's lawyer, or where a privileged discussion between an accused and
his or her lawyer is monitored by an undercover agent.
I stress sanctions, of course, because experience has shown that
to establish standards without effective sanctions is, at best, a meaningless exercise, and can lull affected people into a false sense of security.
Perhaps the most dangerous omission of coverage in S. 804 relates
to the problem of the sham client. I referred earlier to the severely
adverse effect of such practices on the lawyer-client relationship of confidence and trust, an effect that I have already observed in various
parts of the country. (As lawyers have expressed it, to me, "I have
to keep asking myself, 'Is this a real client, or is someone trying to
set me up?')
Under § 3803(a)(4) the "probable cause . . . necessary" standard
must be applied by the Undercover Operations Review Committee before
authorizing an operation in which an agent, informant, or cooperating
individual poses as an attorney. That standard is not required, however,
in the equally serious situation in which the undercover operation involves a sham client. In that event, the lessor standard of "reasonable
suspicion" applies, under § 3803(a)(1) and (2).
Similarly, under § 3803(b)(8) the head of a field office could not
bypass the Committee entirely (also using the lesser standard of
"reasonable suspicion") where an agent, informant, or cooperating
individual is to pose as an attorney; but the head of a field office could
act independently and unsupervised in authorizing (on mere "reasonable
suspicion") an operation involving a sham client.
Those provisions should be rewritten, therefore, to permit
authorization only by the Undercover Operations Review Committee,
and to require application of the "probable cause ... necessary" standard, in any case involving an approach to a lawyer by a sham client.
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Extremely serious, also, is the possibility of infiltration of a law
firm by an agent, informant, or cooperating individual taking the role
of secretary or other staff member. In my view, that kind of undercover operation is never justifiable, and should be expressly forbidden. (One reason is that confidences of clients who are innocent of
wrongdoing would almost certainly be compromised by such an
operation.)
Unfortunately, that kind of operation is not forbidden by S. 804.
Indeed, infiltration of a law office could be undertaken on "reasonable
suspicion," and by the decision of a field office head on his or her
sole authority. By contrast, § 3803(a)(3) properly requires the "probable cause . . . necessary" standard for cases involving infiltration
of "any political, governmental, religious, or news media organization or entity;" and § 3803(b)(1) properly forbids a decision by a field
office head alone where the operation "will involve an investigation
of possible corrupt action by a public official or political organization, or the activities of the news media."
§ 3803(b)(7) does relate to an undercover employee or cooperating
individual who "will attend a meeting between a subject of the investigation and his lawyer." That provision should be broadened,
however, to include cases in which the undercover operative will be
in a position to overhear discussion between an attorney and client,
or to see or hear other privileged information.
More basically, I urge that undercover infiltration of a law office
be expressly forbidden. At the very least, §§ 3803(a)(3) and (b)(1) should
be revised to insure that any such operation will be authorized only
by the Undercover Operations Review Committee, and on the "probable cause . . . necessity" standard.
Earlier in my testimony, I referred to the problem of "trading
up," that is, the situation in which a prosecutor may offer overwhelming
inducements of leniency to one who has just been convicted, to induce
him to provide incriminating evidence against his former lawyer. Such
evidence is inherently suspect, because of the psychological and other
pressures on the former client, and the unconscionable, even coercive,
nature of the inducement. In addition, such practices, by sowing mistrust
between lawyers and clients, could have an adverse effect, in general,
on the lawyer-client relationship of trust and confidence and on the
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.
Accordingly, I recommend that S. 804 provide that neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion can be established against a lawyer
by evidence given by one or more clients or former clients, unless such

Testimony of Monroe Freedman
evidence is corroborated by substantial independent evidence of a reliable
kind.
Further, there is a drafting inconsistency that could have substantial (and presumably unintended) effect. Under §§ 3803(a)(3) and (4)
the phrase used is "a Government agent, informant, or cooperating
individual. . . ." (Emphasis added) However, under §§ 3803(b)(2)
through (10), the word "informant" is omitted. (Also, in some subsections the phrase "cooperating private individual" (emphasis added) is
used instead of "cooperating individual." Presumably, no distinction
is intended there either, and the discrepancy should be eliminated.)
More fundamental proposals for revision relate to the serious problems of conflict of interest that are inherent in targeting judges before
whom members of the Department of Justice have appeared, and in
targeting lawyers who have been in an adversarial role with the Department. It is essential, as we all know, that justice appear to have been
done, as well as that it be done. I think it is bad policy, therefore,
to have undercover operations against judges and lawyers initiated and
carried out exclusively by members of the Justice Department, especially
when there is room for an inference of retaliatory motives.
I have already recommended a judicial warrant requirement. In
addition, I would urge that a special prosecutor, independent of the
Justice Department, be appointed by a federal judge to supervise any
undercover operation directed against a lawyer or judge.
Once again, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Subcommittee,
I appreciate your invitation to testify on this important legislation, and
thank you for your interest in my views.
II.

Oral Testimony of Professor Monroe H. Freedman
Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Law
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary
Regarding S. 804-Undercover OperationsAct
May 16, 1984
Senator Mathias. Professor Freedman.
Mr. Freedman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation to
testify here.
I agree with the goals of the sponsors of S. 804. I admire the
conscientious effort of the Subcommittee in a complex, delicate matter,
and I commend the Subcommittee and its staff for their achievement
in producing S. 804 and the extremely important report that accompanies
it. But I do believe that some additional safeguards should be included, and, in making these recommendations, I am going to focus on
undercover investigations that are directed against lawyers and judges.
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Some of these recommendations may well be applicable to other sensitive areas as well, but I will restrict myself to the area that I have
been working in most intensively for the last 15 or 20 years.
Let me begin by telling you about a lawyer in New York, named
Harry Levine. He was in his law office one day and he got a telephone
call. The man at the other end said, "Mr. Levine, I am in my bedroom.
I have just shot my wife. She is dead on the floor. I am standing here
holding the smoking gun. What should I do?" After only a moment's
hesitation, Levine replied, "Oh, you want Harry Levine the lawyer!"
(Laughter.)
It illustrates a problem that I see increasingly as I speak to bar
groups across the country, that is, lawyers who are becoming afraid
to be lawyers, afraid to provide the effective assistance of counsel that
the Sixth Amendment guarantees to their clients, afraid to give the
zealous representation that the Code of Professional Responsibility
demands, and afraid, in short, to be what the American Bar Association has called, the client's "champion against a hostile world."
More than one lawyer has said to me, "I have to keep asking
myself when I am talking to a client, 'Is this really a client or is
somebody trying to set me up?' When you have that kind of impairment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, innumerable other basic
rights are compromised.
We do have to maintain integrity in the administration of justice,
and I think to that end some undercover operations are necessary. There
is a basic problem, however, with prosecutorial discretion to target
particular individuals-what Justice Jackson referred to as the most
dangerous power of the prosecutor, where the crime becomes being
obnoxious to the prosecutor or getting in the way of the prosecutor.
That problem of prosecutorial discretion is compounded by an
extremely serious conflict of interest, for example, when the judge who
is targeted is one who has been conscientious in upholding the constitutional rights of criminal defendants who have appeared before the
judge, or when the lawyer who is targeted by the prosecutor is one
who has been zealous in defending his or her client's rights. Even if,
in fact, there is no improper prosecutorial motive, we have an extremely
serious and undeniable appearance of impropriety, and of conflict of
interest in such cases.
That prosecutorial power, with its potential for abuse, has already
begun to undermine the independence of the bar, which is essential
to a free society.
This committee has achieved a significant insight and a major suc-
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cess in S. 804 in developing two standards for undercover operations.
One is for ordinary situations, in which reasonable suspicion can be
decided by the head of a field office. The other is for the more sensitive situations, for example, dealing with political and religious groups
or with the press, where the standard is "probable cause to believe
that the operation is necessary to detect or to prevent specific acts of
criminality," and the decision to conduct the investigation in those
particularly sensitive cases must be made by the Undercover Operations Review Committee.
There are two kinds of operations, however, which are not covered
by that higher standard and, I think, must be. One is the case of the
sham client, where the undercover operative is posing as a client and
misleading the lawyer into thinking that the lawyer is dealing with someone who genuinely is in trouble and in need of legal services.
The other is a case, indeed, where I think that undercover operations should be forbidden altogether, but which is not covered in this
bill, and that is infiltration of a lawyer's office. As I say, I think it
should be forbidden altogether, but at the very least, that kind of undercover operation, if it takes place, should be subjected to the higher
standard of "probable cause" and "necessary."
Other recommendations that are made in my prepared testimony
include concern that the statute provides no judicial oversight of prosecutorial discretion at the beginning, through a warrant requirement.
Indeed, throughout the undercover operation, it is entirely a matter
of executive discretion and control, with no provision for dismissal
of a prosecution for abuse of discretion, and, at the conclusion, no
sanctions whatsoever through civil action or otherwise against abuse
of discretion.
What we have therefore, in a government that prides itself on
separation of powers and checks and balances, is the most sensitive
kind of government intrusion of all, undercover operations, with the
discretion exclusively in the executive department.
I would recommend that all three of those bases be covered, first,
that there be a warrant requirement, second, that there be dismissal
on a showing of an abuse of discretion in targeting, and third, that
there be provision for civil action as well.
Also, none of the provisions in the statute deal directly with the
conflict of interest on the part of the prosecutor, including the case
of operations directed against judges and lawyers. I would recommend
that there be a requirement of a judicially appointed special prosecutor,
independent of the Department of Justice, and, therefore, free of any
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conflict of interest, to supervise all undercover operations that are
directed against judges or lawyers.
Another serious problem relates to what prosecutors call trading
up. Assume, for example, that a criminal defendant is convicted and
is offered overwhelming inducement, indeed, unconsionable and cohersive inducement-it may be ten years of liberty-if that convict will
give evidence against his or her own former lawyer.
That kind of practice is destructive -of the essential relationship
of trust and confidence between lawyer and client, and I would recommend, therefore, that the statute say explicitly (whether the standard
that is being applied be reasonable suspicion or probable cause) that
it cannot be met by evidence received from a client alone, without
substantial corroborative evidence from an independent source.

In addition, I think that the legislation should expressly forbid pretrial
publicity by prosecutors and other law enforcement officials, including
press conferences to announce indictments-which serve to smear the
accused and to convict him in the eyes of family, friends, neighbors
and business associates without due process of law.
There should also be provision expressly for injury to reputation.
That is one of the concerns that runs through the committee reports,
of both the House and the Senate. Under Supreme Court decisions,
however, reputation may well be found not to be included under the
phrase "injury to the person." There should be a specific reference,
therefore, to injury to the person through defamation, with provision
for punitive damages because of the extreme difficulty of identifying
in dollars and cents the kind of injury that we are talking about.

Of fundamental importance, also, is that codification with no sanctions whatsoever is not going to be any improvement over FBI or Justice
Department guidelines that can be followed or ignored as the executive
department chooses. As I noted before, this bill does not provide for
any realistic sanctions, none whatsoever that relate to abuse of discretion in initiating these operations and in targeting particular individuals.
Senator Mathias. But let me ask you this, Professor Freedman.
Is there any inhibition in the present state of the law against an agent
impersonating a lawyer? Maybe this is a confession that I would prefer
not to make, but is there anything in Senate Bill 804 that will strengthen
or weaken the expectation that a client now has that the lawyer he
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is talking to is really his lawyer and not an agent, or that the lawyer
speaking to the client can have the expectation that there is a bona
fide client out there?
Mr. Freedman. Mr. Chairman, under the law as it is now, it seems
to me that a criminal defendant would have a strong argument under
the Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment for dismissal of
any charges if the defendant finds that he or she has been dealing with
a sham lawyer. However, when you have Congress saying, in so many
words, that it shall not be a defense, I think you leave that client who
has been dealing with a sham lawyer in a worse rather than a better
position.
If I had to litigate it, I would rather litigate it directly under the
Constitution without this kind of help, than to be faced with the argument that the Congress agrees with the executive that there should be
no defense to the defendant in such a circumstance.
Senator Mathias. Let me follow up with Professor Freedman. Is
there any evidence that law enforcement agencies are actually using
some of these tactics that you are worried about?
Mr. Freedman. Yes. Attached to may testimony, for example, is
a case from Massachusetts, Commonwealth v. Shuman, in which sham
clients were sent to a lawyer in order to gather evidence against the
lawyer.
In the context of that case, as I note in may testimony, I have
no objection to that. I think that the integrity of the administration
of justice is of sufficient importance that some undercover operations
are necessary, even directed against judges and lawyers, but, Mr. Chairman, not without adequate safeguards, and particularly with regard
to judges and lawyers, that most sensitive area, there is a gap in this
proposed legislation. That is, there are highly desirable provisions, in
my view, relating to operations directed against news media, against
political organizations, and against religious organizations, that do not
cover infiltration of a law office, for example, by having an undercover agent pose as a secretary or a paralegal, and the sham client
situation.

Senator Mathias. Would a warrant make you feel any better?

Mr. Chairman, I would not find a warrant to be the solution to the
problems that I have identified, but it certainly is not going to hurt.
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What concerns me is legislation that says, in Section 3803(e), "failure
to comply with the provisions of this section shall not provide a defense
in any criminal prosecution or create any civil claim for relief."
Then in Section 3804(a), "no action may be brought under this
section for injury caused by operational or management decisions
relating to the conduct of the undercover operation."
Again, we are talking about what Justice Jackson referred to as
"the most dangerous power" that the prosecutor wields, and here it
remains totally unfettered, and, if we are talking about actions against
judges or lawyers, in the clearest kind of conflict of interest situation.
Now, it may be that there will be a conflict of interest if a prosecutor targets a newspaper or a television announcer or commentator
who has criticized the prosecutor. I am not suggesting that the only
conflict of interest relates to judges before whom the prosecutor has
appeared or defense lawyers whom the- prosecutor has opposed in an
adverserial role. But those are certainly of extreme sensitivity, and a
warrant is going to help, but the other safeguards that I suggest, including the appointment of a special prosecutor by the judiciary, I think,
would go a lot further toward resolving the kinds of problems I am
concerned about.
Senator Mathias. God forbid that I discourage creating business
for lawyers. I may have to earn an honest living some day. (Laughter.)
But what you are proposing is judicial enforcement of the standards,
and that is going to lead to a plethora of motions to suppress evidence
and all of that kind of activity.
Mr. Freedman. That is what we call due process, Mr. Chairman.
It is not expeditious. Due process has never been praised for its
expeditiousness.
Senator Mathias. Well, that is a forthright answer.

Senator Mathias. This last panel has been worth waiting for. It has
been very enlightening to me. I think it has brought some fresh concepts to this discussion. I am very grateful to all of you.
The committee stands in recess subject to the call of the chair.
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APPENDIX A
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
SUPERIOR COURT
MIDDLESEX, ss
CRIMINAL NO.
80-403
COMMONWEALTH
V.
HARRY N. SHUMAN
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Prior to his trial, both this defendant (Shuman) and a co-defendant
(Dr. Shwartz) moved for appropriate relief upon the ground that they
had been entrapped by public officials. After hearing, this court denied
the motion and the matters went to trial, both defendants being conv.icted. Dr. Shwartz has not appealed but Shuman has and this matter
is thus ripe for the entry of a Memorandum of Decision setting forth
the facts found during the pre-trial hearing and the legal analysis upon
which this court has relied. Commonwealth v. Cook, 351 Mass. 231,
234 (1966) (Kirk, J.).'
1. This court is not unmindful of the fact that in Commonwealth v. Collins,
Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. (1981) 29, 33, "the [trial] judge reserved the right to make
specific findings 'if necessary or appropriate' at a later time" and the Appeals Court
observed "that he should have done so at the time of the voir dire or before the
end of the trial." While this passage may be read as disapproving the practice followed
here, I do not believe it was intended to be construed so broadly. As support for
its observation, the Appeals Court relied on Commonwealth v. Garcia, Mass. Adv.
Sh. (1980) 21, 26 which does not hold that findings and rulings must be made during
the course of the trial but simply expresses the need for such documentation prior
to the hearing of the appeal. The matter is, however, specifically addressed by Mr.
Justice Kirk in Commonwealth v. Cook, supra, where the Supreme Judicial Court
holds that "to require . . . that the judge file his specific findings simultaneously
with his ruling on admissibility, would result in delay in the progress of the trial and
the imposition of a needless burden on the trial judge. If a defendant is found not
guilty, or, if found guilty, does not appeal, the delay in the trial and the effort of
the judge might serve no purpose." It would appear that the Supreme Judicial Court
continues to adhere to these views, see Bruno v. Bruno, Mass. Adv. Sh. (1981) 1572,
1577 ("[Flindings were made from the bench at the close of the case. Certain matters
which might have been dealt with were not mentioned. Although expenditious disposition of contested matters is desirable, there are often situations in which reflection,
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During the summer of 1978, information concerning a possible
insurance fraud came to the attention of the Major Crimes Unit of
the Massachusetts State Police. Proceeding under orders of Captain
Robert Enos, State Police troopers obtained two motor vehicles and
without the knowledge of the insurance companies involved, insured
them under false names. They then staged an accident and another
state trooper, privy to the undercover operation but not directly involved in it, filed a false report of accident which stated, "no visible
sign of injury but claim of injury by an individual involved." He issued
a false citation and a fine was paid pursuant thereto. False accident
reports were then filed with the insurance companies by the undercover troopers claiming to have been involved in the accident. The State
Police reasonably believe that all this was necessary to lay a credible
groundwork to uncover the suspected scheme of insurance fraud.
The undercover troopers went first to Dr. Shwartz. Various inculpatory statements were made by Dr. Shwartz in their presence but
they need not be recounted here as this court does not rely upon them
in determining the motion with respect to Shuman.'
Following a visit to Dr. Shwartz, the undercover troopers made
an appointment with Shuman, an attorney. When they kept the appointment, Shuman introduced himself, took them into a conference
room, and asked, "What are the extent of your injuries?" The troopers
simply laughed jovially and Shuman joined in the laughter.
One of the undercover troopers said, "Ask Shwartz." Shuman
responded, "I'll call him." Shuman proceeded to tell the troopers that
it would look better if they did not return to work and, when they
agreed to stay at home, he said, "Good. We can add this to the claim."
Shuman then said, "You have to get your medical bills up over
$500 to collect" and recommended that the undercover troopers see
certain specialists to which he would refer them. Further inquiry as
to the injuries of one trooper went like this:
Shuman:

"You must have hit your head, right?"

aided by written requests for findings of fact, is the better course"), and, indeed,

the wisdom of the present practice is illustrated by the fact that Dr. Shwartz did not
appeal and findings with respect to him would be of no consequence.

2. It may well be that the statements of Dr. Shwartz are, in fact, the statements
of a co-conspirator made during the course of an in furtherance of a conspiracy, which
statements are thus admissions upon the part of both co-conspirators. Commonwealth
v. White, 370 Mass. 703, 708-709 (1976) (Kaplan, J.). This court need not decide the
point as part of a ruling upon a pre-trial motion, however, since the ruling as respects

Shuman will stand upon a consideration of his own admissions taken separately.
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Undercover trooper: "No."
Shuman: "You must have hit your head on the windshield
and have terrible headaches."
Undercover trooper: "Oh yes, I remember, If [the specialist
to whom you are sending us] is an expert, won't he know?"
Shuman: "He knows how to play the game. You see,
hypothetically you're going to see [the specialist] fifteen to twenty
time but actually you won't have to go see him."
One month later, in a telephone conversation between one of the
undercover troopers and Shuman, Shuman said, "[The other undercover trooper] has gone to the specialist but complained of no injury.
He must be straight as an arrow. I'll have to send him to another
specialist."
Further, the court finds that each time the undercover troopers
were queried by Shuman about their injuries, they laughed in a manner which denoted the absence of any such injuries. The court infers
that Shuman, after these conversations, conferred with Dr. Shwartz
and took further steps to make claim against the insurance companies
for injuries he knew to be nonexistent.
Entrapment is a defense which may be asserted when a defendant is intentionally induced by the government or its agents into
committing all the elements of a criminal offense. United States
v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973). The defense arises only if
the criminal conduct was the product of the "creative activity"
of law enforcement officers or agents, Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932) . . . [but] no "entrapment exists 'if the
accused is ready and willing to commit the crime whenever the opportunity might be afforded,"' Commonwealth v. Miller, 361 Mass.
644, 651 (1972), quoting from United States v. Groessel, 440 F.2d
602, 605 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 933 (1971) [.1
Commonwealth v. Thompson, Mass. Adv. Sh. (1981) 209, 213-214.
The key to the entrapment defense is thus government inducement,
more specifically, the employment of persuasion or inducement to create
a substantial risk that the offense will be committed by a person other
than one who is ready to commit it. Model Penal Code § 2.13(1).
Gilbert, Criminal Law, § 223 (1976). Compare State v. Boccelli, 105
Ariz. 495 for the minority view that "reprehensible police conduct"
will support an entrapment defense on the theory that the primary purpose of this defense is to control police conduct and the accused's
predisposition to commit the crime is therefore immaterial. Here, no
such government inducement or persuasion is present. Here there is
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no evidence of persuasion, importuning, a play on sympathy or other
emotion, or any other factor beyond the simple opportunity for criminal
gain afforded by the circumstances created by the undercover troopers.
Compare:
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 371 (1958) (defendant
only agreed to sell narcotics illegally "after a number of repetitions of the request, predicated on [the informant's] presumed suffering"). Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) (defendant
sold whiskey to agent only after repeated requests and pleas based
on common loyalty to a military unit). United States v. Borum,
584 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (inducement found where undercover agents solicited guns from defendant twenty times).
Commonwealth v. Thompson, supra at 215. Upon these facts,
therefore, Massachusetts law will not support the entrapment defense.
Despite the traditional analysis, the defendant here argues
strenuously that, as an attorney, it is especially reprehensible to "set
him up" and then use against him the statements he made in discharge
of his duty to zealously advance the cause of those he reasonably took
to be his clients. It's difficult to understand just what legal significance
the defendant attaches to this plaint. I take it that he is urging that
the statements he made to the undercover troopers be suppressed upon
the theory that, in context, it is wrong to "sting" a lawyer and thereby
chill the profession's willingness to zealously advocate the client's cause.
While original, this argument is hardly frivolous. Our adversary
system is one which sometimes encourages, and at least tolerates, the
use of subterfuges to get at the truth. Keeton, Trial Tactics and Methods,
326-327 (2d Ed. 1973). Indeed, nowhere are an attorney's obligations
to the truth and his obligations to his clients so sorely tested as in
the area of information gathering from clients and witnesses and
preparation of their testimony. There is general agreement that "witness
preparation for trial purposes is not discovery. This is not the time
to learn 'what the case is all about' or to obtain interesting information. Witnesses favorable to your side must be prepared for testifying
in court to those facts which will support your theory of the case."
Mauet, Fundamentals of Trial Techniques, 11 (1980). A learned and
skillful trial lawyer speaks of the need to "horseshed the witness and
• . . brush him up before he testifies. . . .Do not hesitate to suggest
• . . more effective answers. You and the witness are going over his
testimony to develop that kind of answer. If you shy away from making
suggestions, you are not doing your job. . . .Press the witness if need
be. In extreme cases, put the situation to the witness bluntly." Vetter,
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Successful Civil Litigation, 280, 284-285 (1978). Others frankly recognize
that an attorney has "the opportunity to shape the witness' testimony,
often to the point of recreating it in an image closer to that which
the lawyer desires than to that which the truth requires ....[P]reparation of one's own witness for trial is hardly, under our adversary system,
a public ceremony." Levin & Cramer, TrialAdvocacy, 30 (1968). Judges
and lawyers alike must admit that the line between "facilitating" communication on the one hand and fabricating evidence or suborning perjury on the other is not well marked. 3 Perhaps the most careful analyst
of this area is Monroe Freedman in Lawyers' Ethics in An Adversary
System, 67-69, 71, 74-75 (1975) ("There is no conceivable ethical requirement that the lawyer trap the client into a hasty and ill-considered
answer before telling him the significance of the question"). See Bellow
& Moulton, The Lawyering Process, 247-272 (1978).
Yet even the most expansive and indulgent acquiescence in the norms essential to an adversary system cannot justify Shuman's conduct here. While he may not be faulted for informing his clients of
the legal requirements necessary to support their claim, he cannot be
excused for expressly suggesting to them the fabrication of medical
visits and treatments that were never intended to take place. Any legal
system which condoned such conduct by the officers of its courts would
not be worthy of the name. Thus, recognizing that the line between
propriety and impropriety in attorney-client relationships is difficult
and not always clear, Shuman has nevertheless transgressed far beyond
the conduct expected of the most zealous but honest advocate.
Accordingly, Shuman's motion was denied.

3. Indeed, our present rule governing the conduct of an attorney in a criminal
case who learns that his client intends to testify falsely, DF 13(b) of Supreme Judicial
Court Rule 3:08 (formerly Rule 3:22A), is a candid compromise between the extremes
on either side . . . [of a] controversy [which] is not one capable of solution by any
formula which will be satisfactory to all disputants." Statement of Quirico, J. concerning SJC Rule 3:22A published with the Rule, pp. 5-6 (February 14, 1979).

